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Free trade has long been hailed as the world’s answer to increased 
competitiveness, greater overall wealth and a higher standard of living. 
Adam Smith’s ideas on the foundations of capitalism assert that open 
market policies lead to global economic growth, and conversely that 
protectionist measures stunt growth and inflate prices. Critics argue that 
protectionism helps protect developing markets and industries and 
prevents unfair competition. But in the debate over trade which economic 
policy is actually best? 
To answer this question I conducted an experiment using the board 
game, The Settlers of Catan, as an economic model. I isolated trade as a 
variable and looked at what effect the frequency and magnitude of trade 
had on resource and point accumulation within the game. I collected data 
for 10 games where trade was allowed and 10 games where it was 
forbidden, attempting to identify an empirical contrast between the two 
versions. 
What I found is that no-trade games consistently out produced free-
trade games in terms of both point and resource accumulation, and that 
there was no correlation between trade and either total points or total 
resources. I also found that despite being given the option to trade, 
players would frequently reject seemingly fair offers and instead pay a 
higher price for resources through the in-game bank. I reasoned that this 
behavior was a result of players trying to maintain or extend their 
competitive advantage, which they were able to do by maximizing their 
utility, or value gained, for the game as a whole rather than at any one 
specific stage in the game. This explains why trading was so rare and why 
no-trade games outperformed full-trade games in the experiment. 
The significance of this result can be especially felt in the labor 
market, where labor is a resource traded by workers to their employers. I 
use the recent NFL and NBA lockouts as case studies to show how utility 
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Games are an ancient pastime and occupy a special place in every 
culture in the world. From the Roman Coliseum to the Olympics to the 
high-stakes poker tables in Las Vegas, games provide a pleasant 
distraction from the everyday life and help bring diverse communities and 
cultures together. 
But games can serve an educational purpose, too. Today’s most 
popular board games, such as Monopoly and Risk, can teach us about 
risk management, resource allocation and negotiation. But one other 
game has the potential to teach us even more about how individuals 
approach basic economic problems: The Settlers of Catan. 
The Settlers of Catan, once dubbed the “great board game of this 
era,” is an increasingly popular multiplayer game that features three or 
more players competing on a fictional island in a battle for survival and 
supremacy. Unlike most battles, however, this battle involves no guns or 
soldiers. Instead, the weapons at each player’s disposal are resources, 
which they may use to trade, build and expand. 
The three central aspects of the game are, not incidentally, three of 
the most important facets of modern economics. Trade especially is the 
foundation of today’s capitalist system, and around which all market 
activities are dependent. We see how trade functions in the real world—
facilitating the exchange of goods between buyers and sellers—but how 
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does trade work in The Settlers of Catan? Could the game serve as a 
valid economic model for examining how individuals behave when given 
the option to trade, and how they behave when that option is taken away? 
What could this simple game tell us about one of the most studied topics 
in economics? 
This paper will attempt to answer these questions, in addition to 
many others. By constructing a simple experiment around The Settlers of 
Catan I will attempt to empirically show a relationship, or lack thereof, 
between trade and success in the game. 
In the first chapter, Literature Review, I will look at recent and 
relevant studies in the fields of game theory, experimental economics and 
international trade theory. These three fields comprise the backbone of the 
overall study. 
In the second chapter, The Settlers of Catan, I will introduce the 
game at the center of this study and validate it as a functioning economic 
model by comparing aspects of game play to real world principles. 
In the third chapter, The Experiment, I will discuss the inspiration 
for the study and how I organized an economic experiment to isolate trade 
in the game. 
In the fourth chapter, Data and Discussion, I will present the data 
collected in the experiment and then discuss its significance and 
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relevance to prior and future economic ideas. I will also discuss potential 
sources of experimental error. 
In the fifth chapter, Case Studies, I will look at two real-world 
situations and attempt to show how my experimental findings can be 
applied to the labor market. I will then present my conclusions by 














1. Literature Review 
This study will touch on various aspects of game theory, 
experimental economics and international trade theory. Each of these 
disciplines has its own place in economic literature, but together they can 
help paint a vivid picture of modern economics with tremendous 
implications for the real world. 
Before introducing the game and experiment that will be the focus 
of this study, it is helpful to first review what ideas and theories already 
exist. It will then be possible to build on past research and present new 
ideas. 
 
1.1. Game Theory 
Games have been a part of civilization for as long as anyone can 
remember, but it wasn’t until the early 20th century that the world’s 
greatest mathematicians realized that game theory might have an 
application to economics. The Hungarian mathematician John von 
Neumann is best known as the father of modern-day game theory thanks 
to his iconic 1944 study, The Theory of Games and Economic Behavior.1 
Von Neumann and the economist Oskar Morgenstern looked at parlor 
games like chess and poker and speculated that the theory of games 
might have an application to economics. They are together credited with 
                                                 
1
 John von Neumann and Oskar Morgenstern: Theory of Games and 
Economic Behavior, Princeton University Press (1944) 
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introducing the min-max theorem, which provides a way for players in 
zero-sum games to minimize their utility losses (or maximize their utility 
gains).  
Perhaps the man most responsible for turning game theory into a 
serious discipline is John Nash. Nash, while as a student at Princeton 
University, came up with a theory for games in which there was a 
possibility of mutual gain.  His first paper, “The Bargaining Problem,” 
published in Econometrica in 1950 explained his reasoning: 
A two-person bargaining situation involves two individuals who 
have the opportunity to collaborate for mutual benefit in more than 
one way…no action taken by one of the individuals without the 
consent of the other can affect the well-being of the other one. A 
‘solution’ here means a determination of the amount of satisfaction 
each individual should expect to get from the situation, or, rather, a 
determination of how much it should be worth to each of these 
individuals to have this opportunity to bargain.2 
This one-on-one bargain is at heart of the capitalist marketplace, 
where individuals, governments and corporations come everyday to 
exchange their goods. Yet, there was no economic principle to 
demonstrate how the bargain might work and which party would reap the 
most benefits. 
                                                 
2
 Nash, The Bargaining Problem  
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Nash was not the first to attempt to address this problem. Francisco 
Edgeworth, an Irish philosopher and political economist, speculated that 
“parties to a bargain were acting on the expectation that cooperation 
would yield more than acting alone”.3 Nash took this idea and, using the 
axiomatic approach, reasoned that how two individuals split the gain in a 
trade depends entirely on how much the deal is worth to each individual. 
Nash postulated that a unique solution existed that maximized the product 
of the players’ utilities on “the notion that the bargain depended on a 
combination of the negotiators’ back-up alternatives and the potential 
benefits of striking a deal”.4 
Nash was also responsible for introducing the “Nash equilibrium 
point” by proving that every non-cooperative game has a mixed strategy 
equilibrium, meaning there is a dominant strategy for each player. In doing 
so, he put an end to the circular reasoning that dominated game theory at 
the time and defined a strategy whereby each player picks his best 
response to what the others do. 
This idea is perhaps best personified by the “Prisoner’s dilemma,” 
developed in 1950 by two mathematicians working at RAND, where Nash 
also briefly worked. The dilemma is described as follows: 
Two men are arrested, but the police do not possess enough 
information for a conviction. Following the separation of the two 
                                                 
3
 Nasser, p. 89 
4
 Nasser, p. 93 
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men, the police offer both a similar deal—if one testifies against his 
partner (defects/betrays), and the other remains silent 
(cooperates/assists), the betrayer goes free and the cooperator 
receives the full one-year sentence. If both remain silent, both are 
sentenced to only one month in jail for a minor charge. If each 'rats 
out' the other, each receives a three-month sentence. Each 
prisoner must choose either to betray or remain silent; the decision 
of each is kept quiet. What should they do?5 
Referring to the table below, regardless of what Prisoner A does, 
Prisoner B stands to benefit more by betraying his partner. The same is 
true for Prisoner A, so therefore the dominant strategy for each man is to 
confess. Interestingly the outcome, a three-month sentence, would be 
worse than if both men stayed silent and received only a one-month 
sentence. However, the nature of games and Nash’s assumption that 
players are self-interested guarantees that both men will confess and, 
thus, suffer the consequences. 
 Prisoner B stays silent  Prisoner B confesses 
Prisoner A stays silent  Each serves 1 month Prisoner A: 1 year 
Prisoner B: goes free 
Prisoner A confesses Prisoner A: goes free 
Prisoner B: 1 year 
Each serves 3 months 
 
This paradox “contradicts Adam Smith’s metaphor of the Invisible 
Hand in economics. When each person in the game pursues his private 
                                                 
5
 Prisoner’s Dilemma. Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy  
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interest, he does not necessarily promote the best interest of the 
collective”.6 
This is the takeaway that positions game theory at the forefront of 
economic analysis. The Prisoner’s dilemma may be only one example of 
Nash’s equilibrium point in action, but it does provoke some interesting 
questions. Do today’s capitalist markets function as zero-sum games like, 
where one player’s loss is another player’s gain, or are they more closely 
linked to non-zero-sum games like The Settlers of Catan, where there is a 
possibility of mutual gain? How would players realize this mutual gain, and 
how much of it?  
Games have a powerful way of translating complex economic 
transactions into simple, easy-to-understand models. Games like 
Monopoly and poker can help teach children the basics of risk 
management, resource allocation and negotiation. But they can also help 
economists understand the intricacies of international trade and exchange.  
 
1.2. Experimental Economics 
Experiments are an integral part in the study of any scientific 
discipline, including economics. Data collected from economic 
experiments can be used to answer complex questions, test theories and 
demonstrate market mechanisms. 
                                                 
6
 Nasser, p. 199 
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One of today’s most renowned experimental economists is Vernon 
L. Smith, a professor of Economics at Chapman University’s Argyros 
School of Business and Economics. Smith, the winner of the 2002 Nobel 
Memorial Prize in Economic Sciences is best known for his work in 
designing experimental markets to study the behavior of buyers and 
sellers. He found that even with imperfect information and limited 
competition, the two parties converged on an equilibrium price that would 
have been predicted by the economic theory of perfect competition.7  
 
Smith helped establish experimental economics as a legitimate tool 
in the study of the world’s greatest problems and unanswered questions. 
In a 2005 lecture on “exchange and markets” and the “specialization that 
is the secret of all wealth creation and the only source of sustainable 
human betterment,” Smith discussed the intrinsic beauty of the 
marketplace: 
 
In acts of personal exchange we usually intend to do good for 
others. In the marketplace this perception is often lost as each of us 
tends to focus on our own personal gain. However, our controlled 
laboratory experiments demonstrate that the same individuals who 
go out of their way to cooperate in personal exchange strive to 
maximize their own gain in a larger market. Without intending to do 
                                                 
7
 http://www.nobelprize.org/nobel_prizes/economics/laureates/2002/smith-autobio.html  
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so, in their market transactions they also maximize the joint benefit 
received by the group.8 
 
This statement is a testament to the fact that what individuals 
should do and what they actually do can be two very different things. 
Nash’s hypothesis suggests that the pursuit of private interest won’t 
always translate into the realization of collective benefit, but in a controlled 
environment Smith’s research shows the exact opposite. Both ideas are 
important in economic literature in that they can spur debate and fuel 
additional research. 
One of the great values in conducting these experiments is that it 
can help account for social preferences, specifically things like altruism 
and spitefulness. Human beings, after all, are subject to human emotions, 
and economics is nothing if not the study of human interactions.  
Smith’s work is just one example of how experimental economics 
can be applied to solve real world problems and questions. 
 
1.3. International Trade Theory 
Free trade is the defining characteristic of modern economics. Ever 
since Adam Smith published An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the 
Wealth of Nations in 1776, free trade has been hailed by many as the 
world’s answer to increased competitiveness, lower prices and greater 
overall wealth. His ‘Free Trade’ argument was founded on the idea that “If 
                                                 
8
 Vernon L. Smith – Autobigraphy, Nobelprize.org  
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a foreign country can supply us with a commodity cheaper than we 
ourselves can make it, better buy it of them with some part of the produce 
of our own industry, employed in a way in which we have some 
advantage.” 
This idea has seemingly withstood the test of time, and yet there is 
still much we don’t know about trade. Why do some countries fully engage 
in the free trade system, and why do other countries go to extreme lengths 
to avoid it? Perhaps the most important question to grace the minds of 
today’s economists is what is the true cost of trade?   
  
1.3.1. The Case for Free Trade 
The exact gains from trade are nearly impossible to quantify, but 
there is strong evidence that a positive relationship exists between trade 
and wealth. Jeffrey Frankel and David Romer, two well-regarded 
economists, attempted to isolate the relationship between trade and 
income and found that a 1 percent increase in trade subsequently 
increases per capita income by about 0.8 percent. Once geographic 
variables (countries in close geographic proximity to each other tend to 
benefit more from trade) are eliminated, income goes up by about 2 
percent.9 Other studies vary on the exact statistical relationship between 
trade and income, but nearly all studies found a positive correlation. The 
                                                 
9
 Frankel and Romer (1999) 
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conclusion, therefore, is that more open trade policies logically lead to 
higher per capita income. 
We have seen economies make the transition from no trade to free 
trade at least a few times in modern history. In 1859 Japan opened its 
ports to international trade after 200 years of self-imposed economic 
isolation, otherwise known as autarky. Economists measured the gains 
from this act by looking at the prices of Chinese goods before and after 
the removal of trade restrictions. They found that Japan’s national income 
rose by 4 percent thanks to more efficient allocation of resources and 
access to cheaper goods.10 This figure does not include, however, Japan’s 
growth from acquiring better technology and becoming more productive, 
which is estimated to be much greater than 4 percent. 
The United States, perhaps best regarded as the champion of 
modern capitalism, offers an example of the opposite scenario. In 1807 in 
response to a military conflict, President Thomas Jefferson ordered an 
economic embargo by shutting down American ports to international 
commerce. During the time of the embargo the domestic price of imported 
goods rose by 33 percent and the domestic price of exported goods fell by 
27 percent. Altogether, the 15-month embargo cost the country about 5 
percent of U.S. GDP.11  
                                                 
10
 Bernhofen and Brown (2005) 
11
 Irwin (2005b) 
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Protectionist measures, such as tariffs, quotas and embargos, tend 
to have a negative effect on wealth. Conversely, free trade policies tend to 
have a positive effect. One study found that removing all trade barriers on 
agricultural and manufactured goods would net the world $287 billion, or 
0.7 percent of world income.12 This seems hardly worth the trouble of 
lobbying the world’s governments for more favorable trade policies, but 
the number may seriously underestimate the effect of free trade on 
domestic economic growth. Romain Wacziarg and Karen Horn Welch 
responded to some of the flaws in trade research by compiling a panel of 
each country’s per capita income, investment and trade share. They found 
that the average within-country growth rate is 1.5 percentage points higher 
after periods of trade liberalization.13 This says nothing about what would 
happen if a country went from a complete autarky to capitalism, as Japan 
did in 1859, but it does suggest a positive correlation between trade and 
growth.   
 
1.3.2. The Advantages of Free Trade 
These figures, while telling, fail to capture the full effect of trade on 
an economy. John Stuart Mill, a leading economist from the nineteenth 
century, attempted to identify the “direct economical advantages of foreign 
trade” in his book, Principles of Political Economy (1848). Mill lists 
“specialization,”the practice of more efficiently allocating limited productive 
                                                 
12
 Anderson, Martin and van der Mensbrugghe (2006) 
13
 Wacziarg and Welch (2008) 
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resources (land, labor, capital), as a main advantage of trade because it 
creates a higher real national income. Trade also opens up new markets 
for a firm’s goods, thereby allowing the firm to increase production and 
decrease marginal costs. This increase in productivity, thanks in large part 
to improved technology and greater division of labor, ultimately raises the 
standard of living and per capita income.  
Another understated benefit from trade is increased competition in 
the domestic market. The entrance of more efficient firms into a market, 
and the exit of less efficient ones, typically pushes the equilibrium price 
down and creates more efficient production scales. In addition, consumers 
now have access to a greater and cheaper variety of goods and can make 
more intelligent purchasing decisions. One recent study showed that the 
gains from variety alone were worth about 2.6 percent of GDP.14  
Adam Smith came to this same conclusion more than 200 years 
ago: “In every country it always is and must be the interest of the great 
body of the people to buy whatever they want of those who sell it 
cheapest.”15 And yet, “not only the prejudices of the public, but what is 
much more unconquerable, the private, interests of many individuals, 
irresistibly oppose [free trade].”16 This contrast has troubled proponents of 
free trade for centuries. Many individuals or countries may oppose free 
trade because they can’t see how they could benefit from it, but are they 
                                                 
14
 Broda and Weinstein (2006) 
15
 Smith (1976), p. 493. 
16
 Smith (1976), p. 471. 
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wrong or just misinformed?. It seems that there are as many ideological 
differences between economic thought leaders as there are 
misconceptions.  
 
1.3.3. Developing Markets 
Some opponents of a free trade economy argue that, as in 
mercantilism, it’s a system that allows the more productive countries to 
exploit developing markets. On the surface there is validity behind this 
idea. Small, developing countries suffer from a lack of production 
resources, specifically advanced technology and an intelligent labor force. 
How could these countries ever compete in the global economy? 
David Ricardo, a powerful London stockbroker, attempted to 
answer this question in 1799 with the introduction of the theory of 
comparative advantage. After reading Smith’s book, Ricardo wondered 
what would happen if one country had an absolute advantage in producing 
every good. Would that country still engage in trade? 
Ricardo found that “international trade is not driven by the absolute 
costs of production, but by the opportunity costs of production.”17 To put it 
another way, a country has two options: producing a good at home or 
importing a good from abroad. Logically, a country would choose the 
cheaper of the two options. The cost of producing a good domestically has 
                                                 
17
 Irwin (2009), p. 32 
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nothing to do with the actual costs of production, but rather depends on 
what other goods a country could produce with its resources and the 
respective cost of those goods on the open market. This idea lies at the 
heart of international exchange and helps explain why free trade is 
mutually advantageous. 
For an example of this theory in practice look no further than the 
trade relationship between the world’s most robust economy, the United 
States, and the country that could soon surpass it, China. During the late 
20th century the U.S. held an absolute advantage over China in the 
production of every good, in large part because the U.S. had access to 
advanced technology and an intelligent work force. But the industries in 
which China came closest to matching American productivity were 
apparel, textile mill products and rubber and plastics. These industries 
collectively represented almost all of China’s exports to the United States.  
These exports were so cheap for American consumers because 
Chinese workers were paid significantly less than their American 
counterparts. Although China couldn’t match U.S. productivity, they could 
produce similar goods for a fraction of the cost. Thus, China had a 
comparative advantage in these industries. 
This advantage has begun to disappear, however, as China 
advances from a developing economy into a world power. China risks 
losing its comparative advantage to other low-wage countries, such as 
 20 
Vietnam and Cambodia, that can produce at nearly as high levels as 
China without having to worry about how to pay workers. This is the 
natural cycle of economic development. A country’s position in this cycle 
has no bearing on whether it stands to benefit from trade; instead, a 
country’s wage and productivity levels determine what products would be 
the most profitable on an open market. Ricardo’s theory of comparative 
advantage helps explain why every party should benefit from a free trade 















2. The Settlers of Catan 
The Settlers of Catan was first introduced in 1995 by the German 
mogul Klaus Teber, maker of some of the world’s most popular board 
games. A Euro-style game,18 The Settlers of Catan (SOC) has since 
grown into one of the most popular international board games ever, joining 
the ranks of such household names as Monopoly, Risk and Life. More 
than 15 million sets have been sold as SOC has now evolved into an 
immensely popular pastime among both families and students. 19  
But SOC isn’t just fun and games. Teber’s brainchild is rooted in 
real world ideas and behavior, and is an innovative reflection of modern 
economic principles. According to the Washington Post, it introduces 
players to a world that “serves as a model for solving contemporary 
problems such as trade imbalances, nuclear proliferation, and climate 
change.” 20 What else can we learn from this game that has been dubbed 
“the great board game of this era?” 
                                                 
18
 Euro games, also known as German-style board games, are a 
categorization of games with relatively simple rules, short playing times, 
fairly high levels of abstraction and frequent player interaction.  
19
 Curry (2009), Wired Magazine  
20
 Eskin (2010), The Washington Post 
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SOC, at its core, is a game about growth and trade. The game is 
played on a board of 19 hexagonal pieces, with each piece representing 
one of five resources. Every hex also has a number, 2-12, which 
corresponds to the possible combinations from a roll of two six-sided dies. 
Players build two settlements on these hexes to begin the game and then 
on their turn roll the dice to determine what resources are produced. 
Players then use these resources to build, expand and trade for other 
resources. Points are earned for each additional building on the board as 
well as other special bonuses. 
The goal of the game is to be the first player to reach 10 points. 
There is no dominant strategy to win so how a player gets to 10 points is 
largely a product of positioning and luck. SOC is also a non-cooperative 
game, meaning that players may not 
force each other to cooperate. Instead, 
players are forced to pick an optimum 
strategy depending on the set-up of 
the board and their position on it.  
The board may change but the rules don’t, which means that player 
behavior is often predictable. SOC, therefore, should hold up as an 
economic model because it is both consistent and logical. However, the 
similarities do not end there. To fully appreciate the validity of SOC as an 
economic model it’s important to break down various nuances of the game 





2.1 The Model 
This breakdown of the basic rules of SOC offers a detailed 
comparison between aspects of game play and real world economic 
principles or practices. 21 
 Rule Model 
Resources There are five resources 
available on the island of 
Catan: ore, wheat, sheep, 
brick and wood. Different 
combinations of these 
resources may be 
combined to build, expand 
and trade. 
There are thousands of 
natural resources 
available in the real world, 
including oil, cotton 
(textiles), metals, food and 
wood. These resources 
collectively represent the 
foundation of global trade. 
Trade Players each have the 
opportunity to trade their 
resources during their 
turn. They also have the 
option of trading four of a 
single resource for any 
one resource from the 
bank. 
Most modern countries 
are also constantly 
engaged in trade. As in 
the game, each participant 
has the option of trading 
with multiple partners 
and/or accepting the best 
offer. 
Specialization Limited access to 
resources forces players 
to specialize in the 
production of one or more 
resources. The decision of 
which resources to 
Specialization is the 
corner stone of 
international trade, 
allowing diverse 
economies to efficiently 
produce goods. Which 
                                                 
21
 The Settlers of Catan official rulebook. 
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specialize in is determined 
by each player’s 
respective position and 
strategy.  
goods each economy 
produces is a product of 
geographic and 
socioeconomic factors.  
 
Scarcity There are four hexes each 
for wheat, sheep and 
wood. There are three 
hexes each for ore and 
brick. The set-up of the 
board and the distribution 
of the number tokens 
guarantees that some 
resources will be in more 
abundance than others.  
Scarcity is the 
fundamental economic 
problem, defined as how 
to meet unlimited human 
demand in a world of 
limited resources. 
Economics is the study of 
how societies allocate 
these resources.  
Odds Each resource piece on 
the board has a number 
(2-12) on it that coincides 
with the possible 
combinations from a roll of 
two six-sided dies. The 
number 7 is excluded 
because it is the most 
common roll, and 2 are 12 
are only represented once 
on the board. All the other 
numbers are represented 
twice. 
Players strategically place 
their buildings on the 
board to maximize their 
odds of producing the 
most resources. Some 
resources may be more 
valuable than others. 
There are many variables 
that could affect 
economies and resource 
production, among them 
weather, natural disasters 
and political lobbying. It’s 
impossible to predict exact 
resource production and 
economic growth each 
year, but market players 
can usually come up with 
a fairly close estimate. 
Differences between the 
estimate and the actual 
value help influence 
adjustments to strategy 
(produce more of one 
resource and less of 
another, pursue other 
trading opportunities, 
explore different growth 
strategies, etc).  
Building / 
Expansion 
Given sufficient resources, 
players have the option of 
building an additional 
settlement (worth one 
point) or replacing a 
settlement with a city 
Economies depend on 
improvements in 
technology to continue to 
grow. Settlements and 
cities are a lot like 
factories and machinery, 
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(worth two points). These 
extra buildings give 
players access to more 
resources and increase 
their odds. A city is worth 
double. 
in that both help increase 
production and open up 
new distribution channels.  
Development Instead of building a 
settlement or a city, 
players have the option of 
using three specific 
resources to purchase one 
or more development 
cards . The action or 
reward on these cards 
varies from a soldier 
(move the robber), a 
monopoly (collect all of a 
single resource), a year of 
plenty (collect any two 
resources from the bank), 
road building (build two 
roads) or a victory point. 
Players may use only one 
of these cards per turn. 
Longest road (minimum 5 
connected roads) is worth 
2 victory points. Largest 
army (minimum 3 played 
soldiers) is also worth 2 
victory points. 
There is no “development 
card” in the real world, but 
there is government and 
trade policy. Politicians 
and lobbyists in many 
countries around the world 
have enough influence to 
impact local and 
international trade. There 
also global organizations 
like the World Trade 
Organization and the 
World Bank that can 
create incentives 
(subsidies) or penalties 
(tariffs) for trading specific 
resources. The exact 
influence of these trade 
measures is as 
unpredictable as the 
outcome from playing a 
development card, so a 
realistic comparison 
exists. 
Ports Players may also build 
settlements and cities on 
ports and use them to 
trade. A 3:1 port allows 
players to trade 3 of any 
resource for 1 of any other 
resource. A 2:1 port allows 
players to trade 2 of a 
specific resource for 1 of 
any other resource. This is 
cheaper than trading with 
the bank, which requires a 
4-for-1 exchange. 
Portsalso exist in the real 
world for the purposes of 
reducing the cost of a 
transaction. Without 
access to ports traders 
would have to go inland, 
increasing transportation 
costs and inflating the 
price of their goods. 
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Rolling a 7 Players holding more than 
7 cards in their hand when 
a 7 is rolled must discard 
half their cards. 
Companies with too much 
inventory risk having their 
goods devalued if they 
can’t push them to market. 
 
The Robber The robber lives on the 
island of Catan and is 
moved from hex to hex 
whenever a 7 is rolled or 
the Soldier card is played. 
Once on a hex, the robber 
blocks production of that 
resource for the players 
with buildings on that spot. 
As a protectionist tool, the 
robber functions similarly 
to an economic blockade. 
Blockades also block off 
the supply of certain 
resources and generally 
slow down overall 
economic growth. 
Winning The game ends once a 
player reaches 10 
points—calculated by 
adding up his total number 
of settlements, cities and 
other victory points. 
There is no “winning” in 
the real world, but the 
nature of competitive 
markets dictate that 
economies will always try 
to make as much money 
as possible in as little time 
as possible. 
 
 The model, like most economic models, is a gross 
oversimplification of the real world. However, this does not mean that SOC 
is ill-equipped as a basis for future economic thought and study. There is a 
great deal to be learned from looking at common problems or questions 
from an alternative perspective. Many of the greatest principles of 
economics have been discovered using just this approach. SOC is more 
than suitable as an alternative perspective and, as the remainder of this 





3. The Experiment 
 
3.1. Background  
A friend first introduced me to The Settlers of Catan in 2005, while I 
was still in high school. After only playing a couple of times I quickly 
became enamored with the game. I was intrigued by the simplicity of the 
rules, but also by the complexity of the board and the game, one that 
generated different outcomes every time. It was a game that challenged 
my ability to plan long-term, to balance opportunity and risk and to 
negotiate with my opponents. In short, it asked me to step into a role as a 
fictional country’s chief economist and trade minister.  
Since I didn’t actually own the board game, I often had to resort to 
playing online with like-minded aficionados from all over the world. While 
playing online I came across several variations of the game, the most 
popular of which was dubbed “NTRR7” for “No Trade Reverse Robber 7.” 
What that meant is that trade was disallowed and that any time a 7 was 
rolled the robber had to be placed on an empty tile or, in the absence of 
an open spot, on your own tile. I was puzzled by this variation because I 
assumed that trading and robbing were both integral parts of the game. 
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However, after trying it a few times I became fascinated with how much 
the dynamics of the game changed. 
Not only were NTRR7 games faster than the standard game, 
allowing users to play multiple games in a short period of time, but they 
were often more competitive too. This struck me as odd. In the standard 
game the robber is typically used to disrupt the leader’s strategy and allow 
other players time to catch up, but ironically players had a better chance to 
compete when the robber’s role was diminished and all players had equal 
access to the flow of resources.  
The absence of trade in this variation was also interesting. I had 
assumed trade was a vital part of the game in that it allowed players to 
trade their surplus of resources for other resources that may have been in 
short supply. Yet, players in NTRR7 games had no trouble procuring the 
resources they needed, even though it took a few extra turns in the 
beginning to get going. What is the point of trade, then, if players can be 
self-sufficient and still win the game? 
Later when I again played the standard game with full trade and a 
free robber I observed that trades were suspiciously rare. Players had 
needs, yes, but they often weren’t willing to pay the price to get the 
resource they need. Instead, they were happy to wait until their number 
rolled or the price went down. They had no interest in doing anything that 
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might help an opponent gain an advantage, even if it involved inhibiting 
their immediate chances of winning. 
These observations stimulated the main idea behind this paper. 
What, if any, were the real advantages of trade in a multiplayer, non-
cooperative game such as The Settlers of Catan?  
3.2. Set-Up 
Using SOC as an economic model, I sought to answer this 
question. I wanted to know what players do when faced with the decision 
of whether or not to trade, and at what cost? Are players better off openly 
trading with their competitors, as international trade theory would suggest, 
or is protectionism a more valid strategy? Does a player with an absolute 
advantage in the production of every resource still engage in trade with 
other players? What statistical and empirical effect does trade have on the 
game both during and as a whole?  
To determine what effect trade has on our economic model it’s 
necessary to isolate trade as our only variable. This is possible by 
establishing a new style of game in which trade is restricted, and 
quantitatively and qualitatively comparing the original SOC (FT-free trade) 
and the adapted version (NT-no trade). Thus, there are two versions of the 
game where the only experimental difference is in a player’s ability to 
trade. 
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The researcher then randomly determines which version to play 
and sets up the board. Each participant in the study played at least one FT 
game and one NT game, with many participants playing multiple games. 
The players chosen for participation in this experiment are all 
experienced and familiar with the SOC rules. To ensure fair competition all 
participants signed a ‘Participant Agreement’ [Appendix A] whereby they 
agreed to abide by the rules set forth by the researcher, including the 
three-point rule, explained below.22  
 
3.3. Assumptions 
Any scientific experiment must be carefully designed and executed to 
guarantee the accuracy and validity of the data. To this end I made three 
strong assumptions about how participants would behave within an 
experimental setting. These assumptions are further outlined in the 
participant contract. 
1. Each player will attempt to win the game as fast possible. 
2. Players not in a position to win will attempt to prolong the game in 
order to earn more victory points. 
                                                 
22
 The three-point rule is a common variation of SOC in which players may 
not rob another player, whether by rolling a 7 or playing a soldier card, 
until that player reaches at least three victory points on the board. This 
adaptation is to ensure that all players have sufficient access to resources 
at the beginning of the game, thereby attempting to eliminate the element 
of luck. 
 31 
3. Players will always prefer more resources at the end.
3.4. Data Collection 
 As the researcher, my role was as an observer and an 
administrator, organizing games between participants and ensuring that all 
rules were followed. I also collected data by observing several specific 
variables and recording the results on a spreadsheet [Appendix B]. I 
recorded the relevant data for each turn and then summed up the results 
to produce final game data. These variables were: 
o Roll Number 
o Total Resources Collected 
o Total 2:1 Port Trades 
o Total 3:1 Port Trades 
o Total 4:1 Bank Trades 
o Total Port/Bank Trades 
o Number of Trades 
o Number of Resources Traded 
o Total Victory Points (VPs) 
I also observed when a player reached 6, 7, 8 and 9 VPs to see if 
game behavior changed once a player was close to winning. Since each 
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player starts with two victory points on the board and needs 10 victory 
points to win, a total of six victory points represents the theoretical halfway 
point of the game. In addition to statistical observations I also made 
qualitative observations by writing down notes during and after the game.  
















4. Results and Discussion 
 
4.1. Presentation of Data 
After collecting data for 10 full-trade (FT) games [Appendix C] and 
10 no-trade (NT) games [Appendix D], my non-experimental observations 
held up as true. 
Although NT games were 
generally longer than FT games (70.6 
turns/game vs. 61.9 turns/game), NT 
games produced more total 
resources (176.1 vs. 150.0), more 
total victory points (25.3 vs. 23.8) and 
more resources per turn (2.49 vs. 
2.42). Since resources and points 
were distributed between the three 
players, it can be inferred that NT 
games generated more overall wealth 
and were, on average, more competitive. 
These results become even more pronounced when the data set is 
reduced to a smaller sample. I calculated the standard deviation of both 
 FT NT 
Turns/Game 61.9 70.6 
Resources/Game 150.0 176.1 








Total VP/Game 23.8 25.3 
Resources/Turn 2.42 2.49 
VP/Turn 0.384 0.358 
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the FT set and the NT set in terms of total turns23 and used the respective 
figures to eliminate the outliers in each data set, producing a new subset 
that included 7 FT games (FT7) and 7 NT games (NT7).  
FT7 games still had the advantage in total turns (63.29 vs. 66.71), 
but the disparity shrunk by more than half from the original set. The NT7 
subset, meanwhile, maintained its strong advantage over FT7 games in 
total average resources (173.86 vs. 152.43) and total average victory 
points (25.43 vs. 24.57), and nearly tripled its advantage in resources per 
turn (2.61 vs. 2.41). 
So NT7 games were on 
average 3.42 turns longer than FT7 
games and yet still managed to 
produce an additional 21.43 
resources and 0.86 victory points. 
It should be expected that longer 
games would produce more total 
resources and therefore more 
victory points, but the rate at which 
NT7 games out produced FT7 
                                                 
23
 The reason I used the number of total turns to calculate standard 
deviation is because game length has the single biggest influence on 
other components of the game, including total resources produced and 
total victory points. This will be discussed in more detail on the following 
pages. 
 FT7 NT7 
Turns/Game 63.29 66.71 
Resources/Game 152.43 173.86 








Total VP/Game 24.57 25.43 
Resources/Turn 2.41 2.61 
VP/Turn 0.388 0.381 
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games (0.2 resources per turn) is evidence of an important finding.  
The only statistic in which FT games were favored is victory points 
per turn. The FT set outpaced the NT set by a margin of .026 (0.384 vs. 
0.358) points per turn. However, this margin was nearly eliminated when 
looking exclusively at the respective subsets. FT7 games produced 0.388 
points per turn against 0.381 points per turn for NT7 games, for a margin 
of 0.007 points per turn. It makes sense that FT games would produce 
points at a more rapid pace because players tend to have more options to 
build and expand when trading is allowed. However, the disparity between 
the two data sets is so small as to almost be negligible. 
The discussion of trade theory in Chapter 2 set forth the idea that 
free trade and overall wealth, measured in terms of GDP and standard of 
living, are positively correlated. Conversely, economies that restrict trade 
often suffer from poverty and a slow or negative rate of growth. So why 
then did FT7 games produce less victory points and less resources than 
NT7 games? Wouldn’t we expect it be the other way around? 
If we look exclusively at the FT set of data we see that there were 
on average only 5.6 trades per game and 14.2 resources traded per 
game. Perhaps more telling is the fact that in 9 out of the 10 games there 
were more port trades (2:1, 3:1, or 4:1) than player trades. On average, 
there were nearly twice as many port trades (11.1) as there were player 
trades (5.6).  
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The data from the FT7 subset is even more striking. There are 
slightly more trades (5.71) and more resources traded (14.43) per game, 
but port trades (11.57) still drastically outnumber player trades.   
Part of this is a reflection of scarcity in the game. When certain 
resources are unavailable via the trade market, players have no option but 
to trade in their resources via their ports or the bank. However, it is curious 
that this occurs twice as often as a normal trade, especially since port 
trades tend to be more expensive from the perspective of optimal resource 
allocation. If it’s cheaper to trade with their opponents, then why do 
players flock to the ports with such frequency? Why are there so few 
player trades in the first place? 
Part of the answer may lie in looking at the FT games in more 
detail. I mentioned earlier that I recorded whenever a player reached six 
victory points24 to see if game behavior changed once at least one player 
was close to winning. Let’s call this instance the Point of Impact (POI).25 
In nine out of the 10 FT games studied, there were more trades 
before the POI than there were after it. In total, 37 of 56 trades (66.1 
                                                 
24
 Since players start the game with two victory points and need 10 to win, 
then a total of six victory points represents the theoretical halfway point of 
the game. 
25
 The POI is measured by looking only at how many points a player has 
on the board, including settlements, cities and any other awards like 
Longest Road or Largest Army. It does not take into account points that 
may be hidden in a player’s hand (i.e. VP’s or Soldier cards) and may not 
fully reflect a player’s strategic positioning or chances of victory within a 
particular game. As such, the player who is in the best position to win may 
not necessarily be the first player to reach six victory points. 
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percent) occurred before the POI, accounting for 66.9 percent of the total 
resources traded. In contrast, only 42.3 percent of the total port trades 
occurred before the POI.  
On average, the POI occurred on the 40th turn (39.8) of the game. If 
we recall that an average FT game lasted 61.9 turns, then the POI occurs 
after 64.3 percent of the game has been played. As a result, the fact that 
66.9 percent of the total resources traded came before POI falls roughly in 
line with how many trades we would expect for a game of any length. 
However, the more interesting result is how few port trades there are 
before the POI, and how many there are after it. Part of this is a reflection 
of how many turns it takes players to build on ports before they can be 
used, but players may also have less of an inclination to make a port trade 
earlier in the game if they can get a specific resource cheaper by trading 
with another player. The implications of this contrast will be discussed in 
the next section. 
The results from the FT7 subset are similar in respect to POI. On 
average, POI occurs on the 42nd turn (41.7) of the game, about 65.9 
percent of the way through. Trades before POI account for 67.5 percent of 
all trades, and 69.3 percent of all resources trades. The only significant 
difference is that 50.6 percent of port trades occur before POI in FT7 
games, versus 42.3 percent in all FT games. This can best be explained 
by one unusual game (FT8) in which seven of eight port trades came 
before POI, in large part because POI occurred just seven turns before the 
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end of the game. If we eliminated the data from this game the final 
percentage of port trades before POI would be a more reasonable 46.6 
percent. Thus, POI shows that players tend to utilize each other for trading 
resources early in the game; whereas late in the game players are more 
likely to exchange resources through their ports or the bank.  
Finally, we attempt to measure the correlation between trade and 
the other factors in the game to see what, if any, relationships exist. By 
graphing two variables in a scatter plot and doing a simple regression 
analysis, we can calculate the coefficient of determination (r2) and 
measure correlation.  
Using this method I looked at the following sets of variables for both 
the FT and FT7 sets of data [Appendix E]: 
• Number of Trades vs. Victory Points 
• Number of Trades vs. Total Resources 
• Number of Resources Traded vs. Victory Points 
• Number of Resources Traded vs. Total Resources 
What I found is 
that none of the graphs 
showed any kind of 
correlation. None of the 
 FT FT7 
# Trades vs. # Points 0.0443 0.0421 
# Trades vs. # Resources 0.0124 0.0325 
# Traded vs. # Points 0.0164 0.0111 
# Traded vs. # Resources 0.0064 0.0135 
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coefficients of determination approached even 0.1, indicating that no 
identifiable correlation exists between trade and point or resource 
accumulation. If neither the frequency nor the quantity of trades positively 
impacts the game, then what variable does? 
 Rather than doing a multi-variable regression analysis, it may be 
easier to pinpoint one specific variable: time. Time is measured in SOC by 
number of turns and there is evidence of a positive correlation between 
turns and point and resource accumulation within the experiment. 
[Appendix F]   
Referring to the table below, the r2 values for both the FT and NT 
data sets are significantly greater than anything we saw for the Trade 
graph analysis. Indeed, the experiment showed that a single turn was 
worth 2.42 resources and 0.384 points in FT games, and 2.49 resources 
and 0.358 points in NT games. Thus, we can infer that the variable most 




We would expect longer games to generate more resources and 
points and, consequently, be more competitive. But the more interesting 
 FT FT7 NT NT7 
Turns vs. Points 0.3107 0.7586 0.4785 0.4904 
Turns vs. Resources 0.4452 0.7780 0.7225 0.7260 
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statistical result is how little impact trade had on the outcome of the game. 
Why is this? 
Let’s explore this question and address the significance of trade, or 
the lack thereof, within the study.  
 
4.2. Discussion 
The majority of trade theory literature has hailed free market 
systems as harbingers of economic growth and longevity. Yet in the 
experiment, a model economy closed off to trade outperformed a model 
economy with free trade. What conclusions can we draw from this? For 
instance, does trade have no impact, or even a negative impact, on a 
country’s economic health?  
One perspective is that the existence of open markets doesn’t 
always translate into equal access to those markets. The economic 
superpowers have a supreme advantage when it comes to conducting 
trade for reasons including, but not limited to, more advanced 
transportation technology, favorable political policies and a large 
consumer market. Trade allows the rich countries to get even richer. 
Meanwhile, the poor countries may exhibit some growth but at a far slower 
pace, thus creating a gap in wealth. 
The question this raises is if free trade is a rational economic policy 
for disadvantaged, or developing, countries? We saw in the survey of 
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trade theory literature that the concept of comparative advantage allows 
developing countries to participate in and benefit from global trade. But 
perhaps this is not the right question to ask. Trade, for better or worse, is a 
staple of the global economy. Even countries that tend to be protectionist 
still participate in trade to some extent. The more interesting question, and 
one that has often puzzled economists, is how to reap the maximum 
benefit from trade? 
We know that the main motivation behind any kind of transaction is 
utility – the total satisfaction received from consuming a good or service. 
We derive utility from everything we do—eating breakfast, going for a walk 
or playing games. This same principle holds true in the world of trade. We 
enter the marketplace of goods and services (think of it as a global Wal-
Mart) where we seek to exchange our hard-earned dollars for something 
that will bring us utility. The foundation of trade depends on this idea. If we 
could generate the same amount of utility without ever entering the 
marketplace, we would simply obtain all the items for ourselves in a self-
sufficient economy and no trade would occur. However, if we can gain 
even a minute amount of utility from participating in the open market, then 
trade becomes an absolute. 
Let’s put this into 
mathematical terms. Say 
we have two individuals, 
Cory and Shawn, and they each have a basket of goods worth a certain 
 Cory Shawn 
Pair of shoes +6U +4U 
Watch +8U +12U 
Jacket +1U +10U 
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amount of utility (U). Each item in the baskets has a specific value to each 
individual. Let’s say there is a pair of shoes in Cory’s basket that is worth 
6U to Cory, but only 4U to Shawn. Similarly, there is a watch in Shawn’s 
basket that is worth 12U to Shawn and 8U to Cory. Cory would want to 
trade his shoes for Shawn’s watch because that would increase his utility 
by 2U, yet Shawn wouldn’t be interested in decreasing his utility by 8U. 
There would be no trade. However, what if Cory also has a jacket in his 
basket that was worth 1U to him and 10U to Shawn? He could package 
together the shoes and jacket for the watch, allowing both Cory (+1U) and 
Shawn (+2U) to add to their utility. This is a perfect win-win scenario in 
which both individuals benefit from a trade. 
 Sends Receives Total Gain 
Cory Shoes (6U) + Jacket (1U) Watch (8U) +1 
Shawn Watch (12U) Shoes (4U) + Jacket (10U) +2 
 
But what if we added a third individual to the mix? This is where it 
might be helpful to bring in The Settlers of Catan once again as our 
economic model. Let’s 
suppose Cory and 
Shawn join Eric for a fun 
game of SOC. After a few rolls it is Cory’s turn and he has a sheep that he 
would like to trade for a wheat. Both Shawn and Eric have a wheat that 
they can trade, but neither particularly wants a sheep. Shawn values a 
 Cory Shawn Eric 
Sheep +1U +2U +1U 
Wheat +4U +4U +4U 
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sheep at 2U and a wheat at 4U, while Eric values a sheep at just 1U and a 
wheat at 4U. Cory also values a sheep at 1U and a wheat at 4U. 
Under these circumstances, Cory would have a difficult time finding 
a trading partner since any deal would only help him. Suppose he 
increases his offer to two sheep? Eric still wouldn’t be interested, but 
Shawn would receive equal value by either keeping his one wheat (4U) or 
accepting the offer for two sheep (4U). Cory, meanwhile, would up his 
utility by two. What happens? 
In a benevolent world, Shawn would make the trade and help Cory 
expand on the board. But in a competitive world, like the one portrayed in 
SOC, Shawn would reject the trade and make a counteroffer that would 
allow him to also increase his utility. 
Let’s say that Shawn now demands three sheep for his one wheat. 
Cory would still benefit by doing the trade and increasing his total utility by 
one. Shawn, however, would be the big winner and increase his total utility 
by two. What happens? 
 Sends Receives Total Gain 
Cory 3 Sheep (1U) = 3U Wheat (4U) +1 
Shawn Wheat (4U) 3 Sheep (2U) = 6U +2 
 
At first, this may seem just like the win-win scenario described 
earlier. However, Cory and Shawn are now participating in a competitive 
market in which there can only be one winner. They both benefit from the 
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trade, but the deal helps Shawn more than it helps Cory. What should 
Cory do? 
He has the option of taking the deal as is, bargaining to get the 
price down or holding on to all of his resources. Cory’s decision will likely 
depend on his position within the game and each player’s respective 
chances of winning. If Cory is in the lead then he is more likely to do the 
deal because it’s unlikely to come back and hurt him. If, however, Shawn 
is in the lead, then Cory will likely reject the offer and wait for a better deal 
to come along. 
I observed this exact type behavior on a regular basis during the 
experiment. Players were fiercely opposed to giving up their resources at 
the risk of potentially helping an opponent win. It didn’t seem to matter if a 
trade was mutually beneficial to both parties. What mattered is how much 
more beneficial a trade was for one player than another player. 
Utility theory teaches us that rational individuals should seek to 
maximize their total utility. John Nash identified five points in his definition 
of utility theory for a single individual, the most significant of which states: 
“An individual offered two possible anticipations can decide which is 
preferable or that they are equally desirable.”26 But are players in SOC, in 
fact, maximizing their utility? 
The answer is yes. But how are they doing it? 
                                                 
26
 Nash (1950), The Bargaining Problem 
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When ranking preferences, each player must also take into account 
the preferences of their opponents. Each potential trade involves an 
intricate analysis of how much a good is worth to one player versus how 
much it might be worth to another player. But unlike in the Prisoner’s 
Dilemma, a game like SOC involves multiple decisions. While the decision 
a player makes at one stage in the game may not necessarily be in his or 
her immediate best interests, the decision will always be in his or her long-
term best interests.  
This distinction between single-stage and multiple-stage decisions 
is critical. Even though trades were relatively rare in FT games, trade 
negotiations occurred on almost every turn. Players were constantly 
forced to rank their preferences and think strategically about how much 
their resources were worth, both privately and on the open market.   
I call this behavior Utility Advantage Maximization (UAM). In a 
competitive, multi-stage market, like the one presented by SOC, 
individuals engaging in trade negotiations should seek to maximize their 
utility advantage over others. Utility is not something to be measured on 
an individual basis, but rather something to be considered in the context of 
each player’s respective utility at each stage in the game.  
This idea, I believe, is the primary reason why FT games exhibited 
so little trade activity. Participants demanded such high returns for their 
resources that it was nearly impossible to find a trading partner, especially 
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late in games. As a result, resources became heavily concentrated and 
the trades that did occur were typically lopsided in the favor of the player 
with the best bargaining position, which usually means that player 
controlled the pivotal resource or resources. This explains why point and 
resource distribution in FT games was statistically worse than distribution 
in NT games. 
I also observed that players who did frequently engage in trades 
often struggled to win the game. These players tended to be less 
experienced and, it seems, failed to properly value their resources 
throughout the game. Meanwhile, more experienced players could make 
more accurate valuations and, as a result, were more likely to win. 
The conclusion to be taken away from these findings is not that 
trade is harmful, but rather that it should be approached differently from a 
bargaining standpoint. It’s not enough to just benefit from a trade—it’s also 
important to remain competitive in the open market. Trade shouldn’t be 
regarded as merely a means of sustenance, but instead as an opportunity 
to profit. However, this is only possible when both sides of a potential 
trade are readily engaging in UAM behavior. 
 
4.4. Experimental Error 
Experimental economics is an inexact science and this experiment 
involving The Settlers of Catan is no exception. Despite efforts to control 
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as many variables as possible to improve accuracy and reliability, this 
experiment still had many potential sources of experimental error. 
o Strategy: A player’s individual strategy varies greatly from game to 
game depending on the specific circumstances of each game, 
making strategy perhaps the hardest part of the experiment to 
control for. There is no empirical way to show that players behaved 
drastically different in FT games than they did in NT games. 
Common sense suggests that players would approach NT games 
differently in order to compensate for not being able to trade by, for 
instance, relying on the robber more or settling closer to ports. 
Development cards in general would likely be used more in NT 
games because they represent the only way to acquire certain 
resources. This may partially explain why NT games were 
statistically more profitable and equitable.  
o Sample size: A sample size of 10 FT games and 10 NT games is 
relatively small by experimental standards, especially since the 
results could be heavily influenced by luck . To collect a more 
reliable set of data it would be necessary to play each version of 
the game 50 or 100 times each. Unfortunately, time constraints 
surrounding this study made this impossible. 
o Participants: As the study took place predominantly in Syracuse, 
NY, there was a limited pool of participants from which to draw 
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from. As a result, participants played the same players multiple 
times, eliminating any chance of a true random experiment. 
Participants who were familiar with each other’s strategies and 
tendencies may have played differently than they would otherwise 
in a random game. For instance, some participants may have had a 
natural preclusion to trading that had nothing to do with the 
perceived or realized benefit of conducting a trade. 
o Correlation: Although the experiment focuses on the relationship 
between trade and resource and point accumulation, there is no 
way to definitively prove that a direct correlation exists. There could 













5. Case Study 
The results of my experiment revealed some hidden secrets about 
The Settlers of Catan, but the real question is how can these findings be 
used in the real world? Is Utility Advantage Theory practical in today’s 
free-market system and, if so, how can it be applied to improve human 
welfare and stimulate economic growth? 
The reason why we may not see UAM behavior in the real world is 
because the buyer doesn’t always have the luxury of renegotiating with 
the seller, or vice versa, and has no choice but to pay the marked price. 
For example, the United States is a major importer of oil from the Middle 
East. American policymakers can’t suddenly refuse to pay the market 
price for oil because the U.S. relies too much on oil to power the country’s 
cars and factories. Even if the Middle Eastern sheiks who control the oil 
refineries are keeping the price artificially high, the U.S. still can’t decline 
the trade at the risk of creating a major shortage. 
This is a reality that many consumers and countries face. Global 
trade is dominated by inelastic goods, meaning that price has little effect 
on demand. These goods include such everyday necessities as water, 
electricity, food and fuel. The corporation or nation in control of the good 
typically gets to dictate the price, creating an imperfect market exchange 
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in which the good is overvalued. This is the exact dilemma that players 
face in SOC—forced to choose between overpaying for a good or 
procuring it for themselves through other means. When no other means 
exist, the logical conclusion is that players must accept the price as is. My 
experiment showed that, more often than not, players rejected this idea 
and instead delayed the transaction until conditions were more favorable. 
Nations, of course, don’t have the luxury of time any more than they have 
the luxury of renegotiation. Therefore, UAM has a limited place in today’s 
traditional markets. However, there is one market where UAM behavior 
can help redefine modern economics—the labor market. 
The field of labor economics is as broad and complex as 
international trade theory. Yet, in its simplest form labor is just a 
commodity that is traded between employers (the buyers) and workers 
(the sellers). So what would happen if workers used UAM to demand the 
highest price for their labor? 
Here are two case studies of what happened last year when a 
group of employers collectively decided that they wanted to cut costs and 
increase profits, and how the workers fought back to get a fair price for 
their labor. 
 
5.1. The NFL Lockout 
The National Football League (NFL) is the most successful 
organization in the history of sports. The NFL makes $9 billion in revenue 
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each year, a big chunk of which comes from the country’s most watched 
television program—the Super Bowl. In 1993, the NFL and the National 
League Football Players Association (NFLPA) signed a collective 
bargaining agreement (CBA) that gave players 57 percent of total revenue 
and gave the owners of the 32 NFL teams the remaining 43 percent, after 
the owners took more than $1 billion off the top for operating and 
development costs, such as stadium construction.27 
Consider that dichotomy for a second. The players are the ones 
who are on the field every week sacrificing their bodies so the NFL can 
have something to sell to television networks, and yet they barely get half 
of the league’s billions of dollars in revenue. The owners, meanwhile, 
spend their Sundays sitting in their luxury boxes and stuffing their wallets. 
In the past few years the owners have even begun complaining about 
losing money and publicly lobbying to extend the regular season from 16 
to 18 players. They also wanted a bigger chunk of league revenue. In 
other words, they wanted to earn an even greater profit by reducing labor 
costs. 
Naturally, when the CBA expired in 2010 the players refused to 
continue playing until they got a fair share of the revenue pie. Their 
demands were a higher percentage of league wide spending on player 
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salaries, more benefits for former players and changes made to improve 
health and safety. 28 
When the owners rejected these demands, the players’ union 
decertified and filed an antitrust lawsuit against the NFL, whereby the 
owners promptly locked the players out.29 An important thing to remember 
about this lawsuit is that the NFL had already negotiated contracts with TV 
networks worth over $4 billion to broadcast football games that next 
season, regardless of whether any games were actually played.30 The 
owners were actively colluding against the players until they got what they 
want, and the players refused to back down their demands. Thus began a 
long and heated lockout. 
Unfortunately, this was never a fair negotiation. The players may be 
considered wealthy by most American standards, but very few of them 
could afford to miss a season’s worth of paychecks. In fact, more than 20 
percent of players still live paycheck to paycheck, according to a report by 
MSNBC.com.31 No other professional football leagues paid anywhere near 
what the NFL paid. The owners, meanwhile, belonged to a different 
income bracket, occupied almost entirely by multi-billionaires. A lost year 
of ticket sales and advertising revenue would’ve been merely a minor 
bump in their annual income. The owners could withstand the lockout for 
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many years without worrying about how they were going to be able to pay 
their bills. The players, however, were not so lucky. 
Given these circumstances, it seems illogical that the players would 
even threaten to lockout. But these players weren’t as concerned about 
their next paycheck as much as they were worried about how they would 
maintain a living once their playing careers were over and medical bills 
began to pile up. Players wanted to tighten the financial gap between 
themselves and the owners, not just for active players but also for the 
thousands of retired players and the thousands of players yet to be 
drafted. 
Let’s compare this to The Settlers of Catan. Like in the game, the 
NFL players are prioritizing their future income and benefits over their 
immediate economic interests. In fact, every labor negotiation is almost 
like every SOC trade negotiation, with both parties jockeying to get the 
best deal. Labor negotiations such as these may only occur every few 
years instead of every few turns, but the principles applied are very much 
the same. 
So by sacrificing multiple paychecks, players were forcibly raising 
the market price for their labor and actively cutting into the NFL’s margins, 
attempting to capture a bigger and more equitable share of the financial 
pie. Therefore, they were applying UAM behavior to maximize their 
earning potential. 
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The players’ strategy worked. When the lockout ended in July 
2011, just two months before the scheduled start of the regular season, 
the players walked away with $1 billion in additional benefits for retired 
players, an opportunity to stay on a medical plan for life, increased 
minimum salaries, unrestricted free agency after four years, a true salary 
floor, increased rosters and additional measures to improve player safety, 
including the continuation of the 16-game schedule. The players also won 
55 percent of national media revenue, 45 percent of all NFL Ventures 
revenue and 40 percent of local club revenue.32 
The new CBA included some concessions for owners as well, 
including a rookie wage scale that prevented players with zero games of 
NFL experience from getting paid more than established veterans.33  
The NFL and the NFLPA came to an agreement because both 
sides eventually got what they wanted, or at least most of what they 
wanted. But neither side had much of an alternative. The players couldn’t 
make enough of an income playing elsewhere, and the owners couldn’t 
sell enough tickets with replacement players. Consequently, an agreement 
was inevitable. 
But what if there was another market for the players’ labor? 
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5.2. The NBA Lockout 
As NFL players clung to their demands, the National Basketball 
Association (NBA) was mired in a lockout of its own after the expiration of 
its CBA. Many of the same issues that plagued NFL negotiations were at 
the table once again, including the division of $4.2 billion in revenue and 
the structure of the salary cap and luxury tax.34 
Under the previous CBA, players received 57 percent of basketball-
related income (BRI). The owners felt like this was too much and publicly 
complained about losing money with a couple of franchises even on the 
verge of bankruptcy. The league estimated that it was losing $300 million 
a year with 22 out of 30 teams posting a loss last season, in large part 
because the aftermath of the financial recession continued to negatively 
affect ticket sales. Small-market teams in particular struggled to turn a 
profit because, they argued, player salaries were too high.35 
The players, of course, disputed this claim and rejected an offer 
that would decrease their share of BRI and cut $2 billion over the next two 
years. They also rejected a hard salary cap that would reduce spending by 
at least $13 million per team. The players’ agents also got involved and 
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encouraged their clients to decertify from the National Basketball Players 
Association (NBPA). After months of failed negotiations and an ultimatum 
by the commissioner David Stern, the players dissolved the union and 
sued the NBA in a class action antitrust lawsuit.36 Thus, sports fans were 
treated to yet another lockout. 
The circumstances surrounding the NBA lockout were very similar 
to what happened to the NFL—with one important difference. The NBA 
was not the only league in the market for basketball players. 
Basketball had grown into a major international sport and there 
were competitive professional leagues all over the globe. Even better, 
many of these leagues could afford to pay comparable salaries to what 
players received in the NBA. Thus, more than 90 players signed with 
foreign teams during the lockout, with the majority agreeing to an opt-out 
clause in the event the lockout ended.37 
Deron Williams, a perennial All-Star, was offered $5 million to play 
for a Turkish team.38 Kenyon Martin, a former first overall draft pick, 
signed a contract with the Chinese Basketball Association that would pay 
him $500,000 a month.39 Other stars like Kobe Bryant40 and Kevin 
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Durant41 were also offered lucrative multimillion offers to play in Europe. 
Players who didn’t want to go overseas had the option of participating in 
organized exhibition tournaments all over the country. There was even an 
extensive plan for a team of NBA superstars to tour the world42, much like 
the Harlem Globetrotters have been doing for the better part of a century. 
It’s true that most players would’ve been taking a pay cut by going 
overseas, a migration that The New York Times called “one of the most 
overblown stories of the lockout.”43 Even where there were sufficient 
paychecks, there may not have been jobs. Many foreign teams had 
already filled their rosters by the time NBA players came calling, and they 
didn’t necessarily want to risk disrupting team chemistry by acquiring a 
rental player. But enough outside opportunities existed, both abroad and 
domestically, that the players didn’t have to take the league seriously until 
they got a good offer. 
The league also came to this unfortunate realization and so on 
November 15, the NBA canceled all games through December 15. The 
players stood to lose $350 million for each month of the season, with the 
average player sacrificing $220,000 on their first paycheck.44 The losses 
would mount, of course, as the lockout dragged on. But the players could 
make back at least part of their losses through other contracts and 
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endorsement deals, while the barely solvent owners had to lay off 200 
workers, in addition to another 200 jobs shed by the league office.45  
Even worse, the league was facing heavy criticism from fed-up 
fans, without whom there wouldn’t be any revenue at all. A lost season 
would threaten to destroy the NBA’s brand, especially coming off one of 
the most exciting seasons in league history. The players’ brands were not 
nearly as susceptible and could be developed in external markets. Thus, 
the players held the edge in negotiations. 
As it were, the players played their hand a little too quickly and 
agreed to a deal that was not much different from what was initially 
proposed before the lockout. The NBPA accepted a reduction in BRI to 
51.2 percent for the 2011-12 season, and a reduction to 49-51 percent 
(depending on league growth) in future seasons. They also agreed to a 
provision that allowed each team to waive one player and remove him 
from the team’s salary cap. There was another rule, dubbed the “Derrick 
Rose Rule” that allowed young, premier players to get paid more during 
their rookie contracts. Player salaries otherwise remained unchanged.46 
The two sides also agreed to a shortened season of 66 games starting on 
Christmas Day. 
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In the end, negotiations weren’t as much about money as they were 
about respect. The players wanted to get paid, yes, but they also wanted 
to be treated like equal partners of the NBA experience. The fact that 
Stern had issued an ultimatum struck the NBPA as insulting. HBO’s Real 
Sports commentator, Bryant Gumbel, even went so far as to equate Stern 
with “some kind of modern plantation owner overseer, treating NBA men 
as if they were his boys..[showing] how he’s the one keeping the hired 
hands in place.”47  
Issues of racism aside, the players nonetheless effectively utilized 
Utility Advantage Theory to strike a favorable deal. They treated their labor 
as an in-demand resource and used the free market system to drive up 
the price for their skills. They likely would have received an even better 
deal if the lockout lasted an entire season, but as in all transactions other 
factors also played a role.  
 
5.3. Conclusions 
Professional athletes don’t belong in the same income bracket as 
the majority of Americans, but their struggles against the true financial 
elite reveal a deepening income gap and flaws in the labor system. In 
2000, the top 1 percent of Americans took home 93 percent of national 
income, a frightening reality epitomized by the ongoing Occupy Wall 
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Street movement.48 Income inequality is a growing problem not just in the 
U.S., but in the entire world. But why? 
Open market economies are partially to blame, but free trade 
should not be the chief culprit. The underlying issue is the exploitation of 
workers and strict policies of wage control. Most of the world’s workers are 
violently underpaid and, without the benefit of a union, they are powerless 
to do anything about it. UAM behavior represents a potentially effective 
solution, and one that is becoming increasingly popular. 
In the U.S. alone there are $12 billion worth of goods and services 
traded very year without any currency changing hands. This comprises 
what is known as the barter economy, and according to one industry 
expert it is a business practice that is “on the cusp of exploding.”49  
As more people resort to bargaining the market exchange system 
should become more efficient, with trades optimized to generate the 
maximum utility. This behavior may not always be practical or even 
possible, but individuals and institutions are nonetheless constantly 
making trading decisions and assigning values to various commodities. 
Perhaps if they approached trade the way that players in SOC do, maybe 
they would over time be able to tighten the income gap.   
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These are some of the main takeaways from my experiment and 
discussion. But no scientific study should ever be considered complete. 
There are still many unanswered questions from my study of The Settlers 
of Catan that require further thought and examination. For instance, what 
if a game started as FT and then reverted back to NT halfway through? 
What if the game switched between the two styles at random? How would 
players alter their strategies and behavior if they didn’t know whether or 
not trading was an option? What would happen if the game didn’t end 
once a player reached 10 points? Would they players still be competitive? 
What if players didn’t have access to ports or the bank? Would they 
reduce their trade demands without any alternatives for getting a specific 
resource? 
The answers to these questions and many others are now the 
responsibility of future economists, who may choose to use my work as a 
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By signing this agreement, participants agree to take part in a research experiment that 
will examine the role of trade in modern economies, using the board game, Settlers of 
Catan, as a model. Participants will play the game in one of two variations (defined 
below) while the researcher records statistical and empirical data. This data will then be 
used to complete a Capstone project through the Honors Program at Syracuse University. 
This experiment will run for a predetermined period of time during which participants 
will play Settlers of Catan in a controlled environment under the supervision of the 
researcher. The researcher will not interfere with game play unless requested to do so by 
participant(s). Individual games may not exceed three total participants and will 
continue until a participant reaches at least 10 victory points. Participants will be granted 
access to data from the experiment at the completion of the thesis in April 2012. 
Eligibility: 
Participants must have played Settlers of Catan a minimum of 5 times (any variation), or 
otherwise shown mastery of the game and its rules as determined by the researcher. 
Variations: 
Participants will play Settlers of Catan according to the rules set forth by the researcher, 
which will be announced prior to the beginning of the game. Each individual game will 
either, 
(1) Allow trade, according to the standard rules of the game. 




Participants must try to accumulate as many victory points as possible by means of any 
conceivable strategy, including, if necessary, prolonging the game by way of targeting 
the probable winner. Alternatively, if in the lead then participants must try to end the 
game as soon as possible. Participants must also follow the three-point rule. * All other 
rules are as defined in the standard game rulebook.  
* A player may not the place the robber (via a 7 roll or a soldier card) on any hex occupied by a 
player with less than three visible victory points. 
 
I, ________________________________________________, hereby agree to abide by the 
terms of this contract. Furthermore, I understand that violation of this contract at any 




Signature      Date 
 
Appendix B 
Sample Data Sheet 
Participants:         Total VP’s - 23 
o DB – 10 
o KR – 8 
o RO – 5 
 
Roll # Ore Wheat Sheep Brick Wood Total # Trades # Traded 2:1 3:1 4:1 
8 2   1  3      
3  1   1 2      
11 1     1      
4 2 1  1 1 2      
10 1  1  2 3      
5   2   2      
5   2   2      
6  1 1 1  1      
7      0      
5   2   2     1 
8 2   1  3 1 5    
9  4    4      
9  4    4      
12      0      
5   3   3      
4    2 2 4 1 2    
4    2 2 4 1 2    
9  4    4      
5   4   4      
8 4   1  5      
 68 
10   3  2 5 1 2    
9  4    4      
10   3  2 5      
7      -4      
4    3 2 5      
4    3 2 5 1 2 1   
11 4     4      
8    1  1      
10   4  2 6      
8    1  1      
11 4     4 1 2    
6   3 1  4      
9  5    5     1 
6   3 1  4      
7    0 0 0 1 2    
7      0      
4     3 3      
8 4   1  5      
4     3 3     1 
4     3 3      
8 4   1  5     1 
7      0     2 
10   4  2 6      
6   3 1  4    2  
6   3 1  4      
5   5   5      
8 5   1  6    1  
            
   SUM   146 7 17 1 3 6 
Appendix C 
 
Full Trade Data Set 
# Rolls # Total 
Resources 













58 136 6 14 2 0 3 5 25 FT1 
47 146 7 17 1 3 6 10 23 FT2 
74 184 10 27 3 4 4 11 25 FT3 
64 168 8 22 4 0 4 9 26 FT4 
44 127 6 17 3 0 4 7 20 FT5 
85 160 3 7 4 6 3 13 23 FT6 
63 132 6 13 3 3 2 8 24 FT7 
54 111 6 16 2 0 6 8 23 FT8 
56 124 1 3 9 0 1 10 22 FT9 
74 212 3 6 8 11 11 30 27 FT10 
          
619 1500 56 142 39 27 44 110 238 FT TOT 
          
61.9 150 5.6 14.2 3.9 2.7 4.4 11.0 23.8 FT AVG 





FT Standard Deviation = 12.85 [calculated in Microsoft Excel] 
61.9 +/— 12.85 = (49.05, 74.75) 
Sub data set should only include games with between 49 and 75 rolls. This eliminates 









NO Trade Data Set 
 
 
NT Standard Deviation = 14.02 [calculated in Microsoft Excel] 
# Rolls # Total 
Resources 













443 1067 40 101 31 18 31 80 172 FT7 TOT 
            
63.29 152.43 5.71 14.43    11.57 24.57 FT7 AVG 
# Turns # Total 
Resources 













62 162   2 1 16 19 24 NT1 
68 167   2 4 6 12 25 NT2 
57 149   0 1 8 9 23 NT3 
69 206   12 1 17 30 27 NT4 
54 117   0 3 4 7 22 NT5 
90 211   15 2 6 23 27 NT6 
73 181   8 0 8 16 26 NT7 
95 216   14 6 7 27 26 NT8 
80 183   10 9 3 22 27 NT9 
58 169   7 0 5 12 26 NT10 
          
706 1761   70 27 80 177 253 NT TOT 
        
 
 
70.6 176.1   7.0 2.7 8.0 17.7 25.3 NT AVG 
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70.6 +/— 14.02 = (56.58, 84.62) 
Sub data set should only include games with between 56 and 85 rolls. This eliminates 












r2 = 0.04434    r2 = 0.01241 
# Rolls # Total 
Resources 













467 1217   41 16 63 120 178 NT7 TOT 
            
66.71 173.86      17.14 25.43 NT7 AVG 





   
  r2  = 0.01645 
    












Time Correlation Graphs 
 
# Resources Traded vs. Victory 
Points 
# Resources Traded vs. Total Resources 
# Turns vs. Victory Points (FT) # Turns vs. Victory Points (NT) 
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Summary of Capstone Project 
Games have always been a part of our human culture. From cards 
to chess to Monopoly, games bring people together and challenge us to 
adapt and think strategically. In this project I sought to use economic 
literature and studies to see how one of today’s most popular games might 
help us understand more about the world we live in. 
The Settlers of Catan (SOC) is a Euro-style game that was 
released in Germany in 1995 and is today one of the most popular board 
# Turns vs. Total Resources (FT) # Turns vs. Total Resources (NT) 
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games in the world. SOC is essentially a game about growth and trade. 
The game is played on a fictional island of 19 hexagonal pieces, with each 
piece representing one of five different resources. Each piece also has a 
number token, 2-12, representing the possible combinations from a roll of 
two six-sided dies. Players build settlements on these hexes to begin the 
game and then roll the dice to produce resources. Players may then use 
these resources to build, expand and trade for other resources. The goal 
of the game is to be the first player to reach 10 points, with points awarded 
for each building as well as other bonuses.  
The game was designed to closely model the real world, and it 
touches on such things as trade negotiations, economic growth and 
expansion, scarcity and specialization, resource management, 
government policy and even luck.  
I decided to focus on trade. I wanted to know how trade functioned 
in the game and if it actually mirrored what we see in the real world. To do 
this I had to set up an experiment. I wanted to isolate trade as the only 
variable in the game and so I constructed an adapted version of SOC 
where trade was restricted. 
I then recruited experienced players to play the original version (FT 
for free trade) and the adapted version (NT for no trade) as I recorded the 
results. Among the things I looked at were how many total trades there 
were, how many resources were traded, how many total resources were 
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produced and how many total points each player ended the game with. I 
collected data for 10 FT games and 10 NT Games, and then compared 
the two data sets. 
What I found is that the NT games consistently out produced FT 
games in terms of both total resources and total points. Even though NT 
games were statistically longer, they still produced more resources per 
turn and nearly as many points per turn.  
These results go against modern trade theory, which endorses free 
trade policies for their ability to stimulate economic growth and a higher 
standard of living. Likewise, economies that are isolated from trade 
struggle to grow. However, this is not what happened in the experiment. 
Players in this study showed a remarkable unwillingness to trade, 
preferring to use other, more costly means to acquire a resource. I 
reasoned that this behavior was due to players putting a premium on their 
resources because they didn’t want to help an opponent win. It didn’t 
seem to matter how beneficial a particular trade was to any single player. 
What mattered is how much more advantageous the trade was, meaning 
how much a player gained versus how much other players gained. 
This conclusion isn’t any different from traditional utility theory, 
which states that individuals always seek to maximize their utility, but it 
does represent a new way of thinking about a typical situation. Instead of 
maximizing their utility at any one stage in the game, players instead seek 
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to maximize their utility for the overall game. This requires taking into 
account how much another player might benefit from any potential deal 
and, if necessary, rejecting what seems like a mutually beneficial trade. 
To apply these findings to the real world I took a look at the labor 
market, where employers play the role of buyers and workers play the role 
of sellers, with labor as the prized commodity. I specifically focused on the 
recent NFL and NBA lockouts to illustrate how professional athletes were 
behaving like players in SOC by demanding the maximum price for their 
labor and refusing to work until they got the deal they wanted. By 
prioritizing their long-term interests over their short-term interests, the NFL 
and NBA athletes were able to coerce the owners into paying a fair price 
for their labor. 
 There are other potential applications of these findings, but the 
main takeaway is that individuals and institutions should approach trade 
negotiations from a competitive perspective rather than one dominated by 
sustenance. If enough economies emulate this behavior then gradually the 
income gap should narrow. 
